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Sequels To Vincent v. Bullock*
Harriet S. Dagget4
Many years have passed since a decision from the Supreme Court
of Louisiana has been so eagerly awaited as was that of Humble Oil
and Refining Company v. Arcede Guilloryl and its companion St.
Martin Land Company v. Stephen L. Pinckney.2 The issue was of
interest not only to the legal profession, but to all persons engaged in
the oil and gas business and indeed to the people of the state as a
whole since Louisiana's important resource, minerals, was involved.
As in the case of Vincent v. Bullock,' the court exerted extreme
care, patience, and skill in rendering these decisions, which surely
must meet with the approval of all informed, disinterested parties.
Vincent v. Bullock was reapproved in general principle and extended
to cover its 'converse issue, as the two decisions under discussion deal
with a sale instead of a reservation of royalty with no right to search
the land. Minority was found to suspend the right to products of a
search. Students have hoped for this outcome, if and when the issue
was presented, since the holding in 1939 in regard to the reservation
of royalty.4
The St. Martin Land Company case appears to have been de-
cided first, as it is referred to in Humble Oil Company v. Guillory
rendered on the same day; it will be outlined first. Without mention
of various transactions, succession proceedings, et cetera, which were
decided in line with fairly well settled law, the simple facts pertinent
to the royalty right were that the land company had sold a certain
royalty interest more than ten years before this suit and was at-
tempting by action in jactitation to find out the status of the right.
Obviously, the plaintiff's plea was that the right had prescribed. One
heir of the buyer was a minor. Justice Ponder, who wrote the leading
opinion, adhered closely to the decision in Vincent v. Bullock, which
had announced the royalty interest not to be a servitude but "a con-
*192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
tProfessor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 87, 862 (Nov., 1947), rehearing refused (reported
in The State Times Dec. 16, 1947).
2. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 38,163 (Nov., 1947).
3. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 85 (1939).
4. Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana (1939) 188.
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ditional obligation, depending on an uncertain event, that prescribed
in ten years if the event did not happen prior thereto." Justice Pon-
der pointed out the difficulties which the court had experienced in
exploring the uncharted course of mineral law. He spoke of the ten
year prescription applied in Vincent v. Bullock as having been in
reality but a reasonable rule. Since that period had been settled in
regard to mineral servitudes, the court felt that a fortiori it should
apply to a lesser right, royalty, bare of the power to search which
accompanies a servitude. Since minority suspends prescription unless
specific law to the contrary exists,' suspension for the minor heir
was the only logical answer as to that part. Under the specific lan-
guage of Act 232 of 1944 suspension for the minor did not benefit
his coproprietors. But for the timely passage of that act an interesting
question in regard to the co-owners would have arisen, and they
might have been saved under an indivisible theory since the event,
production, would seem to fall into such a category.
In his concurring opinion in Humble Oil Company v. Guillory,
Justice Ponder naturally followed statements in the St. Martin Land
Company case together with a very fair explanation of his position
on the first hearing of the Guillory case wherein he felt that he had
been in error due to a misconception of the meaning of the contract
as differentiated from the content of the instrument interpreted in
Vincent v. Bullock.
Justice Hamiter, concurring in the decision in St. Martin Land
Company v. Pinckney, wrote a most interesting opinion. After stat-
ing his view that a royalty interest of this nature is not a servitude,
since it is bare of the right to search with incidents attendant upon
that right, but is a real right running with the land, he then set forth
his differences of opinion so far as the reasoning of the Vincent v.
Bullock case was concerned. He found the suspensive condition pat-
tern unsatisfactory, as logical application would continue the right
without a starting date for prescription until the uncertain future
event had occurred. Certainly this point is well taken and even more
convincing in connection with a sale of royalty than with a reserva-
tion thereof,' so far as strict adherence to the articles of the Code are
concerned. The justice then stated that his concept of this type of
royalty was that of the sale of a hope under Article 2451, a thought
shared by other students particularly before the matter was crystal-
lized by the court in Vincent v. Bullock. A further development of
5. Art. 3554, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. (1939) 1 LoUISIANA LAW Rr.vu.w t16.
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theory by Justice Hamiter is noted in his position that while the
"royalty interest is a real right, a real obligation," a suit to establish
the right or have it recognized would not be an action for immovable
property within the intendment of Article 3548, placing the pre-
scriptive period at thirty years. The justice then applied the ten year
prescription for personal actions laid down by Article 3544.
In writing the leading opinion in Humble Oil and Refining
Company v. Guillory, Justice Hamiter did not refer to his thesis on
the sale of a hope. After finding that the interest involved was "basic-
ally and fundamentally identical with that of the Vincent v. Bullock
case," the justice gave his attention to the plea of potestativeness in
the condition, grounding his rejection of that defect mainly on Ar-
ticle 2035 and the thought that the vendor landowner would suffer
detriment if he exercised his will in the direction of failing to insti-
gate a search wherefrom the royalty owner might benefit.
Public Policy
In reviewing these decisions as a whole, it appears to the writer
that the court's attitude on public policy was indeed praiseworthy.
The right of free contract was upheld, as was observance of the seem-
ingly settled property rule.
Large sums of money have been spent in dealing with the well
known mineral interest, royalty, and so common is the conveyance
that royalty deed forms, devised for use in selling this valuable prop-
erty right, are even available in quantity from commercial printing
houses. To render nugatory or uncertain useful contracts covering
lawful subject matter and made in good faith for valuable consid-
eration is a matter of serious concern to the welfare of the state. In
recognizing this right of free contract in regard to all matters not
prohibited and particularly as pertaining to dealing in royalty, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1939 said:
"In reaching this conclusion we think the trial judge failed
to give consideration to the fundamental principle that legal
agreements have the effect of law upon those who form them
and that 'none but the parties can abrogate or modify them'
(Article 1945, Revised Civil Code), as well as the corollary rules
for the interpretation and construction of contracts as laid down
in Section 5 of Chapter 3 of Title 4, Article 1945 et seq., of the
Revised Civil Code, under the heading 'Of The Interpretation
Of Agreements,' and the provisions of Article 1764 of the Re-
vised Civil Code under the title dealing with the general pro-
19481
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visions of conventional obligations, which provide. that 'All
things that are not forbidden by law, may legally become the
subject of, or the motive for contracts ....
It would be passing strange if this important interest, an integral
part of Louisiana's greatest resource, could not be safely dealt with
under the clear intent of contracting parties. Future interests of like
nature are constantly changing hands in all states fortunate enough
to possess such resources. The following headnote from Beam v.
Dugan' is illustrative:
"Under conveyance transferring part of 'landowner's roy-
alty,' consisting of rentals in 'any and all oil produced or saved
from any wells to be drilled upon' land, grantees acquired per-
petual interest in royalties Out of any oil produced, irrespective
of under what lease such oil was produced."
If evil results from a decision, then, under any system of law,
that decision should be overruled by court or legislature. Judges
under the civil law, never having been bound by the doctrine of
stare decisis, have ever been free and ready to modify the law to pro-
mote justice better under changed social or economic conditions.
However, when no evil is present and citizens on the faith of a set-
tled rule of'property have trustfully contracted, the Louisiana courts
together with all others have been loath to break this faith. The
Chief Justice of Louisiana in 1931 said:
"The decision of the highest court of a state, on the subject
of oil and gas leases, or mineral rights, establishes rules of prop-
erty; and they should not be reversed, even though a contrary
rule might be deemed more logical, unless it be by an act of the
Legislature."'
The Contracts
In finding the contracts substantially and in principle identical
with that of the Vincent-Bullock case, the court was again on very
7. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 12, 187 So. 85, 39 (1939).
8. 2 3 P. (2d) 58 (Cal. App. 1933). See also 3 Summers, Oil and Gas (1938)
498, § 605; 2 Thornton, Oil and Gas (1932) 644, § 863; Thuss, Texas Oil and Gas
(2 eC. 1935) 161: Summers, Transfer of Oil and Gas Rents and Royalties (1931)
I" Texas I. Ii,,. 1.
9. Vi'oherson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 318, 323, 137 So. 46, 49 (1931),
(:ting l'armer's Heirs v. Fletcher, 11 La. Ann. 142 (1856); Cunningham v. Steid-
.nan, 133 La. 44, 62 So. 816 (1913); Minn. Mining Co. v. Nat. Mining Co., 70 U. S.
:32, 18 L,. Ed. 42 (1866); Truskett v. Closser, 236 U.S. 223, 35 S. Ct. 385, 59 L.
Ed. 5149 (1915); Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 35 S. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856
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solid ground. A comparison of the more troublesome Humble Oil
and Refining Company v. Guillory with Vincent v. Bullock follows.
The contract in Vincent v. Bullock:
"It is however, understood and agreed that the vendors (of
land) herein reserve unto themselves and their heirs and as-
signs, in perpetuity, a one-sixteenth (1/16th) royalty of all the
oil, gas and other minerals produced and saved from said prem-
ises; and royalty to be delivered to the vendors or assigns, free
of cost of production and a royalty of twenty-five cents per ton
for all salt and sulphur mined and marketed off said premises.
This royalty reservation forms part of the purchase price."'"
The contract in Humble Oil and Refining Company v. Guillory:
Sold to Augustus Hill Garland in 52 acres of land "the un-
divided one-fourth interest in and to all royalties stipulated for
or hereafter to be stipulated for, in any oil, gas or mineral lease
that may be or has been executed in favor of third persons and
more particularly in that certain lease executed in favor of the
Louisiana Oil and Refining Corporation or its assignors and
granted by vendor on a certain tract of land . . . It being well
understood and agreed that the interest herein conveyed is and
will remain an interest in all contracts by the vendor with third
persons for the exploration and development of the said lands
for oil gas or other minerals, the purchaser not to participate
with the vendor in any of the proceeds of the rental of the said
land for said purposes, but only to share in the royalties in the
proportions above set forth. This grant to be continuous and to
run with the land into whomsoever's hands it may fall: by as-
signment, bequest, devise or otherwise."
There are two differences in the wording of these contracts
which it is submitted, are entirely immaterial to the essence of the
contract and are but "accidental stipulations."
. "Accidental stipulations, which belong neither to the es-
sence nor the nature of the contract, but depend solely on the
will of the parties. The term given for the payment of a loan,
the place at which it is to be paid, and the nature of the rent
payable on a lease, are examples of accidental stipulations."' 1
10. 192 La. 1, 7, 187 So. 85, 37 (1989).
11. Art. 1764, T 3, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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First, while the reservation-sale of royalty in both contracts pur-
ports to be in perpetuity, there is no specific mention of a lease in
the Vincent-Bullock contract while there is in the Guillory contract
though all other mineral contracts to be made by the vendor are also
mentioned. It is common knowledge that the landowner rarely con-
ducts the search for minerals himself and that the search is ordina-
rily committed to a lessee. In neither contract was the right to search
retained by the royalty owner, the subject matter in both cases being
a percentage of production and the conduct of the search was ob-
viously not the concern of the owner of the royalty interest. Since
the subject matter of the Guillory contract was a percentage of pro-
duction under an existing lease and under all future mineral con-
tracts to be made by the vendor, whether lease contracts or otherwise,
necessarily the method of search was clearly the choice of the vendor
who retained the right to make it.
The second difference between the wording of the contracts is
that in the Vincent v. Bullock situation, a promise to deliver the
royalty (production) is found. Obviously this clause added nothing
as the seller is bound to deliver in any case.12 The application of
this well known principle by our courts is so frequent as to make
citation tedious.
Article 2037 of the Revised Civil Code states that: "Every con-
dition must be performed in the manner that it is probably that the
parties wished and intended that it should be."
Certainly there can be no doubt that responsible persons dealing
iII royalty intended that a search for oil should be made by the party
r,.taining this right and duty. The court has recognized and applied
tlis principle through the years in many and varied situations.'"
In Vincent v. Bullock, the court quoted the following: "If a
I..ndowner sells royalty he is selling the proceeds that may issue
from his right to explore for minerals on his own land, which is an
12. Arts. 2475-2479, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. Otis v. Pittsburgh-Westmoreland Coal Co., 199 Fed. 86 (C.C.A., 3rd,
1912); Walls v. Smith, 3 La. 498 (1832); Durrive v. Frere, 11 La. 374 (1837);
Lanfear v. Blossman, 1 La. 148 (1846); Duclaud v. Rousseau, 2 La. Ann. 168
(1847) (donation); Bowman v. McElroy & Bradford, 15 La. Ann. 646 (1860);
Atkins v. Shreveport & It. R. V. Ry. Co., 106 La. 568, 31 So. 166 (1901); Girault
v. Feucht, 117 La. 276, 41 So. 572 (1906); Adeline Sugar Factory Co. v. Evange-
line Oil Co., 121 La. 961, 46 So. 935 (1908); Andrews Coal Co. v. Board of
l)rectors of Public Schools, 151 La. 695, 92 So. 303 (1922); Blaushild v. Rock-
hold, 7 La. App. 709 (1927); Oliver v. Home Service Ice Co., 161 So. 766 (La.
App. 1935); Leinhard v. Meyer, 11 La. App. 328, 123 So. 130 (1929) noted in
(191.3) 18 Tulane L. Rev. 160.
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inherent part of his ownership of the land."14 In neither case was
the contract predicated upon a lease but upon the uncertain future
event, production, which in Vincent v. Bullock the court said must
happen within ten years, the term set by the law. This landmark
decision was handed down after most careful consideration by the
court preceded by exhaustive research and receipt of expression from
all informed sources available. In the opinion, a full paragraph is
given to recital of these facts.' 5 This decision has been constantly
honored by the court since it was handed down. Conveyors and
their attorneys relied upon it. The court made clear the distinction
between royalty under an existing lease, likened unto rent because
consideration for the lease, and royalty sold independently without
the right to search and as a possible issue from the land. Laymen
are clear on the distinction and many landowners are willing to sell
royalty when they are not willing to part with control of their right
to search.
It seems proper that this concept of royalty as a mineral right
having been carefully and deliberately evolved by the court to
validate and protect those who constantly deal should not at this
date and in absence of any apparent injustice have been discarded.
Vincent v. Bullock should not have been overruled sub silentio or
otherwise. Even if the contract should be said to have been predi-
cated upon a future lease, the court has said flatly that lease-servitude
and thus the term might again be said to be set by law.
The Potestative Condition
The potestative condition which might upon first impression
be seen in a sale of royalty was most carefully analyzed by Justice
Hamiter in his opinion in the Guillory case. After consideration
of the articles of the Civil Code and pertinent comments and
hypotheses of French writers, he arrived at the eminently correct
conclusion that the condition was not potestative. The apparent
basis of the cure was that the obligor would suffer actual loss if he
failed to exercise his power to search. This element has certainly
been the criteria in many Louisiana decisions and properly so. It
was doubtless a realistic factor under the facts of the case under
discussion. However, there might easily be situations where it would
be to the advantage of the obligor not to search. Suppose he had
sold all of his royalty at a good figure. Delay rentals, together with
a possible bonus, might be unattractive in comparison with keeping
14. 192 La. 1, 15, 187 So. 35, 40 (1939).
15. 192 La. 1, 11, 187 So. 85, 38 (1939).
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the entire landowner's share after waiting even a full ten years, not
to speak of a short period if active leasing developed late in the
term. Take Pothier's hypothesis, cited in Justice Hamiter's thesis,
wherein the promisor was to give in case he went to Parish so that
in order to escape payment, he must refrain from going to Parish.
The assumption was that he would suffer a penalty by not making
the trip. But assume that he did not want to go, had no real inten-
tion of going, would lose money in some other way by going, then
the economic detriment basis for validity of the condition is lost.
Of course the hypothesis would still stand under the theory of legal
restraint, a factor which is not present in the royalty situation, where,
if no affirmative duty lies and no economic loss postulated, restraint
of any kind seems to be absent.
Under the writer's analysis, the vendor, landowner, in the instru-
ment of sale, by Guillory, was not liable to suffer detriment within
the meaning of Article 2035 by his failure to lease, but it would
appear that he was also legally bound by Article 2037 to make a
sincere effort to see that a search was made and again by Article
2040 was bound not to hinder the happening of the condition. The
condition was not potestative for the landowner could not will oil
to be or not to be under the land. The search, while it might depend
on the obligor's will, was an obligation which he was bound to
perform under Articles 2037 and 2040 and hence was squarely within
the permissive terms of Article 2035. The court in numerous cases
dealing with contracts allegedly null because of the potestative con-
dition has read the law of Article 2037 into the contract and found
the simple condition of Article 2035 approved in the clear term of
the article.
For example, when a promise to buy was conditioned upon
approval of a loan by a homestead association, the court said, "Plain-
tiffs inescapable duty was to apply to the ... association for a loan
in order to obtain the money required for the purchase of the prop-
erty."' Again, when a sale of land was conditioned upon title
examination by the buyer, the court found no potestative condition
as the buyer was bound to examine the title or cause it to be
examined and not to reject it, if it was found to be good."
In the Guillory contract, the vendor, who retained the right to
search was bound to exercise it himself or through his lessee and, if
16. Morrison v. Mioton, 163 La. 1065, 1071, 113 So. 456, 459 (1927).
17. Girault v. Feucht, 117 La. 276, 41 So. 572 (1906).
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oil was found, to deliver the amount of the contract to his vendee.
Obviously, finding of oil cannot depend upon the obligor's will.
Searching does depend upon his will but since he is obliged by law
to search, there is no reprobation to this condition."8
Again, the vendor under Article 2040 is bound not to prevent
the happening of the condition. Certainly the finding cannot ensue
without search, hence the vendor must instigate a search or prevent
the happening of the condition. Conditions suspensive in the civil
law are the same as conditions precedent in the common law. Mr.
Justice Fuller of the Supreme Court of the United States declared
in the case of City of New Orleans v. Texas and Pacific Company9
that, "The suspensive condition under the Louisiana Code is the
equivalent of the condition precedent at common law."2 For that
matter, in Article 2013 are found these very words, "These conditions
are either conditions precedent, which suspend the operation of the
contract until they are performed .... "
The concept of conditional obligations comes from the Roman
law. Gaius said, "A condition is said to be suspensive, when the
commencement of a legal transaction is made dependent upon
it ... .22
Basic Louisiana Code articles were taken, of course, from the
French Code. From all sources comes the principle that in an
obligation conditionally suspensive or precedent the obligor may do
nothing to prevent or hinder the happening of the uncertain event.
After all, that is but simple common sense and justice, and even
without specific authority might well be drawn from the four
corners of any system of law. Common law sources state the prin-
ciple this way:
"Where a contract is performable on the occurrence of a
future event, there is an implied agreement that the promisor
will place no obstacle in the way of the happening of such event,
18. Blaushild v. Rockhold, 7 La. App. 709 (1927); Ewell v. Giamanco, 19 La.
App. 672 (1932); Oliver v. Home Service Ice Co., 161 So. 766 (La. App. 1935);
(1931) 5 Tulane L. Rev. 396; (1932) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 23; (1939) 13 Tulane L.
Rev. 442; (1943) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 160.
19. 171 U. S. 312, 18 S. Ct. 875, 43 L. Ed. 178 (1897). This material was first
discussed by the author in Royalty in Louisiana, (1941) 13 Miss. L. J. 332.
20. 171 U. S. 312, 334, 18 S. Ct. 875, 883, 48 L. Ed. 178, 186.
21. Art. 2013, La. Civil Code of 1870.
22. Tomkins and Lemon, translators, The Commentaries of Galus on the
Roman Law (1869) 184.
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particularly where it is dependent in whole or in part on his
own act .... "'
Article 2040 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 appears in
these words:
"The condition is considered as fulfilled, when the fulfill-
ment of it has been prevented by the party bound to perform it."
A supreme court justice in the 1832 decision of Walls v. Smith, 4
dealing with a bond, rejected this recitation as a mistranslation
which he thought might lead to "absurd consequences" and declared
that the "obvious sense of the French text is, that the condition is
considered as accomplished, when the debtor, whose obligation
depends on this condition, prevents the accomplishment of it ...""
Chief Justice O'Niell speaks of the Louisiana Code's translation from
the French text as "incomplete and inaccurate" and states that the
"French text of the article (2035) of the Code of 1825 ... [Article
1178 of the French Code] means that the condition is considered
fulfilled, when it is the debtor, bound under the condition, who
prevents the fulfillment."20 He says further that, "The error in the
translation was observed long ago, and the French text has always
prevailed in the decisions of the court." '27 This salutary principle
has been frequently resorted to by Louisiana courts. The case of
Rightor v. Aleman 8 is an early illustration of the application of
Article 2040 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. The plaintiff was
a surveyor who performed a professional service for the defendant
for which the latter gave his promissory note for $1,000. The plaintiff
signed a receipt, which appears in the following language:
"'Received of Mr. F. Aleman his note for one thousand
dollars, it being the price agreed upon for the surveying of the
land sold by the heirs of P. Aleman to La Ferrie're. Now it is
agreed that should the survey of mine not be sustained by the
courts, then I am to deliver up said note to F. Aleman; but
23. 13 C. J. 648, § 722. See also Mock v. Trustees of First Baptist Church of
Newport, 252 Ky. 243, 67 S. W. (2d) 9 (1934); Anson, Principles of the Law of
Contract (Corbin's 5 Am. ed., 1930) 438; Corbin, Supervening Impossibility of
Performing Conditions Precedent (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 421.
24. 3 La. 498 (1832).
25. Id. at 501.
26. See Southport Mill v. Friedrichs, 171 La. 786, 793, 132 So. 346, 848
(1931).
27. Walls v. Smith, 3 La. 498 (1832); Rightor v. Aleman, 4 Rob. 45 (La.
1843); Morrison v. Mioton, 163 La. 1065, 1072, 118 So. 456, 459 (1927); Kock v.
Emmerling, 63 U. S. 70, 74, 16 L. Ed. 292, 293 (1860). See Southport Mill v.
Friedrichs, 171 La. 786, 793, 132 So. 846, 348 (1931).
28. 4 Rob. 45 (La. 1848).
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should it be sustained, then it is to be paid in full.' A. F.
Rightor."29
The defendant and his coheirs effected a compromise, without await-
ing a trial of the case alluded to in the receipt. They thus "rendered
impossible the fulfilment of the conditions contained in the receipt
delivered by the plaintiff; the defendant's obligation to pay, thereby
became perfect, and he cannot be permitted to say that the consid-
eration had failed. Civil Code, Art. 2035."3° The Supreme Court
of the United States in 1860 applied the principle in Kock v. Emmer-
ling,3 1 a suit to recover a broker's commission from a client who
simply refused to complete a sale after all arrangements had been
made by the dealer. The court said, "It would be a novel principle
if the vendor might capriciously defeat his own contract with his
agent by refusing to pay him when he had done all that he was
bound to do."3" The case of Lloyd v. Dickson33 presented a contract
for joining efforts to control an insurance company of which the
plaintiff was to be manager. Defendants subsequently entered into
a contract with a third party, competitor of plaintiff, to negotiate
and benefit from the same scheme. Plaintiff sued for damages.
Defendants offered in support of a plea of exception of no cause
of action that the obligation was suspensively conditioned upon the
control of the company being secured, and that it was not alleged
that control was secured. The court, in overruling the exception
and remanding the case for trial, said that "the obligation of de-
fendant was not to control the company, or to secure the position
for plaintiff; but only to endeavor to do both."34 They then applied
Article 2040 and said, "If instead of standing loyally by their contract
with plaintiff the defendants enter into a contract destructive of it,
the condition, as a matter of course, can never be fulfilled. . .. ""
This case seems partially to fit the new situation. There was no
absolute promise to control the company, but to endeavor to do so,
and, while it is not clear what would have been judicially considered
a reasonable effort to do so, certainly some affirmative duty was
laid upon the obligor in addition to the negative one not to put it
beyond his power to meet his obligation by actually starting negotia-
tions detrimental and contrary to it. The most frequent application
of the principle seems to be (as in the previously cited United States
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 46.
31. 68 U.S. 70, 16 L. Ed. 292 (1860).
32. 63 U. S. 70, 74, 16 L. Ed. 292, 294.
33. 116 La. 90, 40 So. 542 (1906).
34. 116 La. 90, 92, 40 So. 542.
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Supreme Court case of Kock v. Emmerling)," in regard to the
prevention of a broker's realization of his promised commission by
a refusal of the landowner to sell when a prospect has been found or
by selling on his own hook to a third person without the broker's
knowledge or consent.3 7 These cases are thoroughly familiar to the
profession and it would be tedious to recite them.
The case of New Iberia Sugar Company v. Lararde"8 presents
an interesting analogy for the oil problem under discussion. In this
case the plaintiff sued to recover damages in the sum of $26,000 for
alleged breach of contract. The contract in question was to the
effect that plaintiff, a sugar refining company, bound itself to buy
cane from the defendant, a cane grower, for a five year period at
so much per ton. The defendant sold his plantation with no mention
of or arrangement for the carrying out of the contract, thus com-
mitting an active breach and making it impossible for him to
perform. The court awarded damages based on the'refining com-
pany's losses in not being able to get cane to grind, et cetera. The
court stated that by this contract the cane grower "obligated himself
to grow and deliver the cane on his plantation for a fixed period
of time, in his name as owner, and deliver it to plaintiff as stipu-
lated," and that his failure to do so "was a breach for which he (was)
liable in damages.""9  The court said further that, "The contract
entered into between the parties had all the elements to make it
legal. There was a definite price. The parties to it had agreed
upon all its terms and conditions. There was a defined thing to be
delivered by one and paid by the other."40  In the royalty sale or
reservation the landowner certainly could not be said to have obli-
gated himself to produce oil, but there is an implied obligation to
make a reasonable effort to secure production by leasing or attempt-
ing to lease to a reliable company.
In the case of Owens v. Muslow4" plaintiff and defendant en-
tered into an option agreement whereby plaintiff paid $50,000 cash
for the option and promised $100,000 for a later date, and defendant
bound himself to deliver to plaintiff a deed to certain oil properties
for the agreed price of $1,300,000 less the $150,000 paid, "provided
25,' Ibid.
3:;. Gl I. S, 70, 16 1,. Ed 292 (1860) cited supra note 24.
:17. See Southport Mill '. Friedrichs, 171 La. 786, 132 So. 346 (1931); Luckett
Land an Emifgration Co. . Brown, 118 La. 943, 43 So. 628 (1907).
3S..,A0 La. 387, 58 So. 16 (1912).
:;9. 130 La. 87, 397, 58 So. 16, 19.
40. 130 l.a. 187, 398, 58 So. 16, 19.
.1. 166 La. .23, 117 So. 449 (1928).
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that plaintiff should furnish defendant, on or before January 15,
1920, a security or guaranty satisfactory to defendant for the payment
to defendant of $1,150,000 on January 15, 1922, with interest at 5
per cent per annum, payable annually."42
The plaintiff declined to avail himself of the option and aban-
doned it three days before its expiration; five years later he brought
suit for the return of the option money, alleging among other things
that the defendant was not bound to deed the property to plaintiff
unless satisfied with the security which plaintiff might tender him.
The court disposed of plaintiff's contention by pointing out that he,
and not the defendant made the performance of the condition
impossible by abandoning the option and failing to submit any
security at all to defendant with which he could be satisfied. or
dissatisfied. The court said further:
"Now the contract before us may have been a harsh one for
plaintiff, but it was not a mere nudum pactum. For it did put
certain obligations on defendant.
"First of all it imposed on defendant at least a natural obli-
gation, 'binding in conscience and according to natural justice,'43
to consider honestly the security which plaintiff might offer him
and to accept that security if unquestionably sufficient to secure
his debt, under pain of forfeiture of his good name, which every
man pledges for the performance of those obligations which
bind him in conscience. And we think further that defendant,
having received a valuable consideration for the option, would
have been legally bound to accept any security with which a
reasonable man ought to have been satisfied. . .. ""
The last passage seems peculiarly fitting in a consideration of
the problem under discussion because the primitive owner of the
land in any case, having this real burden running with it, must be,
in the language of Justice St. Paul, under an obligation "binding
in conscience"45 at least to accept a lease. If it could be proved that
a landowner refused to subscribe to a reasonably advantageous lease
contract, might it not be said by a royalty owner that he prevented
the happening of the condition?
42. 166 La. 428, 424, 117 So. 449.
43. Art. 1757, La. Civil Code of 1870.
44. 166 La. 423, 427, 117 So. 449, 450 (1928).
45. Art. 1757, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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An affirmative duty has been implied in lease contract. One
author has said:
"Quite generally, when oil is discovered, the lessee is under an
implied duty reasonably to develop the rest of the land leased.
Under a lease for no specific term of years, the so-called 'no
term' lease, such a duty attaches within a reasonable time after
execution of the instrument. Under any kind of lease, where
the leased land is in danger of being drained by operations upon
adjacent lands, the courts have commonly implied a duty in
the lessee to drill offset wells. A failure to fulfill the implied
obligation under any of the above situations suffices to establish
a forfeiture and to permit the lessor to maintain an action of
ejectment."4
The second edition of Professor Merrill's work on "Covenants
Implied in Oil and Gas Leases" contains a chapter on "Implied
Covenants between Others than Lessors and Lessees."47 The cases
imposing upon the grantee the duty of diligent exploration are
numerous in situations analogous to, though of course not identical
with, the one under discussion. The case of the sublessor's reserving
overriding royalty4" presents an interesting parallel, as his sole
interest is in production, as is that of the owner of Louisiana royalty
per se, since he has no other interest in the land, nor has he the
right to search or control.
Obviously, these problems of affirmative duty and hindering
the happening of the condition were not at issue. In the writer's
judgment, developing such extensions for comment but further
strengthens the court's firm stand on the potestative condition, in
connection with what was actually before them.
New Developments
From the standpoint of future development and creative juris-
prudence Justice Hamiter's concurring opinion in the St. Martin
Land Company v. Pinckney case4" is the most interesting phase of
the coupled decisions and is most challenging to the student. His
valiant effort to cut the coat to better fit the figure of the Civil Code
is most heartening.
46. Note (1938) 24 Wash. U. L. Q. 91, 101.
47. Merrill, The Law Relating To Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases
(2 ed. 1940) 184, c. IX.
48. Johnson v. Moody, 168 La. 799, 123 So. 330 (1929).
49. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 38,163 (November, 1947).
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In St. Martin Land Company v. Pinckney he departs from the
future condition idea of the Vincent v. Bullock5 decision and de-
velops the concept of a sale of a hope. Here again, however, no
affirmative duty is placed upon the vendor in the analysis. In fact,
he is especially relieved from it and takes a double chance first on
whether there is oil and second whether his vendor will try to find it.
The Roman differentiation between things having a potential
existence and those having none is set forth. However, as to the
latter situation the Romans frankly took the view that a chance 5'
and not a thing was being purchased and under their system as well
as all others while there was no guaranty that fish would be caught,
the net had to be cast. If an illustration of an illegal nature may be
pardoned, no one would realistically expect that the dice would not
be thrown or the poker hand not be played after the bets were down.
It would appear that a reasonable attempt to search, to cast the net,
personally or through a lessee, should be expected of the one holding
the searching rights or even under the gambling contract of the
Roman law. After a reasonable attempt to search, certainly there
is no warranty to find and the sale of the hope may be a satisfactory
answer. Without a reasonable attempt surely the vendee should at
least get his money back without having to pursue the vendor by
action in fraud with proof of intent and all other attendant diffi-
culties. In the analysis of the sale of the hope as in the discussion
on the potestative condition, a lack of duty on the part of the vendor
seems to weaken the basic strength of the argument, unless detri-
ment, a pure assumption, is postulated.
Prescription is said by Justice Hamiter, further discussing the
sale of a hope, to begin to run when the completed sale, which,
incidentally the Romans did not have, was executed. The justice
very properly pointed out the fact that under the future condition
idea of the Vincent-Bullock case, prescription could not properly be
said to start until the happening of the condition. It would seem
that prescription in the sale of a hope analysis should start at the
time of the "casting of the net," the date when the action for delivery
under Roman law would lie, if fish were caught.
After giving the starting date of prescription under application
of Article 2451, Justice Hamiter after a process of elimination applied
Article 3544, the general ten year term for personal actions not other-
50. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
51. See Rodin, Roman Law, 220.
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wise specially provided for. He held this article to be fitting under
the theory that while "a royalty interest is a real right, a real obliga-
tion, a suit to establish the right or have it recognized would not be
an action for an immovable within the intendment of" Article 3548,
the thirty year prescription for an action for an immovable. "It is
not a jus in re; it is merely a jus ad rem."52 The suit is a personal
action, although the interest on which the litigation is predicated is
a real right or obligation (since it was stipulated to run with the
law). It is not and cannot be considered as a real action in the sense
of being a suit to recover an immovable.
Obviously, the justice had to steer away from a thirty year pre-
scription, a difficult maneuver particularly with such an unwieldy
craft. It is hard to conceive of a right running with the land, a real
right, an incorporeal immovable being at one and the same time a
personal right prescribed for protection in ten years. If the original
vendor-landowner should sell all of his royalty, sell the land to
another and go bankrupt or depart from the country, certainly the
royalty owner would have relief against the new landowner and
his lessee to have his percentage of production allocated before it
emerged from the ground for that matter, else the right does not
run with the land. Act 205 of 1938, perhaps the one slight manifesta-
tion of legislative displeasure with the magnificent structure created
by the court, indicates the over-all desire to have mineral contracts
share the protective actions available for immovables. To apply the
prescriptive bar for personal actions has the same result as a denial
of a right of action. The idea of the split action advanced by Justice
Hamiter presents an avenue of escape, but since there is but one
procedure, it leaves nothing, rather than a portion. The metaphysics
of the split action always seem confounding in any case for in some
situations where the theory would appear to be easily applicable as
for example in partition, 8 the lesser action is carried along by the
weight of the greater, as an incident. However that may be, the
fat was successfully retrieved from the fire and certainly at this
stage the method or theory is relatively unimportant, when the faith
has been kept. The court must decide and is denied pursuit of the
delightful byways so dear to the heart of the commentator.
52. Black's Law Dictio~itry, Jus ad rem, "A term of civil Law, meaning 'a
r! ht to a thing;' that is. a right exercisable by one person over a particular
Orticht of property in virtue of a contract or obligation incurred by another
person in respect to it. and which is enforceable only against or through such
other person. It is thus distinguished from ju8 in re, which is a complete and
absolute dominion over n thing available against all persons."
53. Miller v. rhurphy, 187 La. 230, 174 So. 272 (1937).
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